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Abstract 
In  this  paper  we  estimate  aggregate  matching  functions  taking 
advantage  of  a  rich data base that  enables  us to  compute  observations 
on the  variables in the  matching function  at (virtually)  any frequency 
to  assess  the  importance  of  the  time  aggregation  problem.  We  also 
generate  stocks,  outﬂows  and  inﬂows  of  vacancies  and  job  seekers 
to  shed  light  on  the  importance  of  stock-ﬂow  matching.  Finally,  we 
assess the  contribution  of labour  market programme participants to 
matching. 
Our  evidence  rejects  random  matching.  More  precisely,  we  ﬁnd 
that  a  non-trivial fraction  of  new job  seekers  match instantly (within 
the ﬁrst week), that stocks of  “old”  vacancies and job  seekers do not 
contribute  signiﬁcantly  to  matching  and  that  the  inﬂow  of  vacancies 
matches  with  the lagged stock  of job  seekers.  Our  results  also  suggest 
that labour  market programme participants  contribute to  matching 
to  a lesser  extent than  openly  unemployed job  seekers. 
We also  ﬁnd  that the use of lagged  stocks as right-hand  side vari­
ables in  matching functions (i.e., ignoring  the  within-period inﬂow 
of job  seekers  and  vacancies) gives lower  estimates  of  matching  elast­
icities  and  that  this  is  more  pronounced  the  lower  the  measurement 
frequency. 
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Labour  markets  are  characterised  by  frictions,  implying  that  the  realloc­
ation  of jobs  and  workers  normally involves  the  coexistence  of  unemploy­
ment and  vacancies as well  as large  ﬂows of jobs and  workers.  An eﬃcient 
matching  process  in  the  labour  market  contributes  to  both  lower  unem­
ployment  and  higher  employment  rates.  Hence,  it  is  a  prominent  policy 
target to promote  an  eﬃcient  matching  between  vacancies  and job  seekers 
in  the  labour  market.  For  this  to  be  eﬀective,  we  need  good  indicators  of 
labour market matching  eﬃciency.  Shifts in  Beveridge curves (the relation 
between  unemployment  and  vacancies)  have  often  been  used  as  evidence 
of  changes  in  matching  eﬃciency.  However,  Beveridge  curves  may  shift  for 
a  number  of  reasons,  not  all  connected  to  the  eﬃciency  of  the  matching 
process.1  A  more  direct  way  to  look  at  matching  is  by  means  of  aggreg­
ate  matching  functions.  Estimated  matching  functions,  typically  giving 
the  number  of  matches  as  a function  of the  numbers  of  vacancies  and job 
seekers,  provide  information  on  how  matching  eﬃciency,  reﬂecting  labour 
market frictions has  evolved.  Over  time,  an increasing  number  of  empirical 
studies  using  a  matching  function  framework  has  accumulated. 
Empirical  results, presented in  a  recent  survey  of the  matching function 
literature  (Petrongolo  &  Pissarides  2001),  indicate  that  matching  func­
tions  have  been  unstable  in  a  way  consistent  with  deteriorating  match­
ing  eﬃciency  in  several  OECD  countries.  However,  the  analysis  in  Gregg 
&  Petrongolo  (2005)  suggests  that  the  instability  in  estimated  matching 
functions  partly  reﬂects  mis-speciﬁcation  problems.  More  speciﬁcally,  the 
authors  point  to  problems  of  time  aggregation  when  using  discrete-time 
data (Burdett et al. 1994,  Berman 1997)  and  the existence of  non-random 
matching,  leading  to  so  called  stock-ﬂow  matching  models  (Coles  1994, 
Coles  &  Smith  1998,  Coles  &  Petrongolo  2003). 
There  are  only  two previous  studies (Edin & Holmlund 1991, Hallgren 
1996)  of  matching  functions  on  Swedish  data.  Neither  of  them  explicitly 
considers  the  stability  of  the  matching  function.  Instead  the  focus  is  on 
the  contribution  of  active  labour  market  programmes  to  matching.  Their 
main  result  in  this  respect  is  that  programme  participants  contribute  less 
to  matching  than  openly  unemployed job  seekers. 
In the present paper we  estimate aggregate  matching functions, paying 
1It  is,  for  example,  well  known  that  changes  in  the  inﬂow  rate  to  unemployment, 
ceteris paribus,  give  rise  to  shifts  in  the  Beveridge  curve. 
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this,  we  take  advantage  of  a  rich  data  base,  that  enables  us  to  compute 
observations  on the  variables  entering  the matching  function  at (virtually) 
any  frequency.  This  means  that  we  can  assess  the  importance  of  the  time 
aggregation problem.  We  can  also generate  stocks,  outﬂows  and inﬂows  of 
vacancies  and job  seekers  at  any  chosen frequency.  Hence,  we  can  also  shed 
light  on  the  importance  of  stock-ﬂow  matching.  Because  we  observe  the 
durations  of  unemployment spells, we can investigate whether the negative 
relationship  between  programme  participants  and  matching  may  be  more 
than  just  a  correlation  induced  by  long  unemployment  durations  among 
programme  participants. 
2  The  matching  function 
The  matching  function  is  a  way  to  summarise  the  results  of  the  eﬀorts 
of  workers looking  for jobs and  ﬁrms looking  for workers to  ﬁll  vacancies. 
This  is  a  complicated  process  involving  a  large  variety  of  activities.  The 
usefulness  of  the  matching function  as  an  analytical device hinges  critically 
on the assumption that the complicated  matching process can be summar­
ised by  a (reasonably)  stable function that  relates the  number  of  matches 
at  any point in time to the number  of job-seekers, the  number  of  vacancies 
and (possibly)  a  small  number  of  other  variables. 
The  simplest  matching  function  can  be  written 
Mt  =  m(Ut,Vt);  m1 >  0, m2 >  0  (1) 
where  Mt  is the  number  of  matches (jobs formed) in a given point in time, 
Ut  is  the  number  of unemployed job  seekers2 and  Vt  is  the  number  of vacant 
jobs.3 
Random  matching  Under  random  matching4 unemployed  workers  and 
vacancies  are  randomly  selected  from  Ut  and  Vt  and job  seekers  ﬁnd jobs 
2More generally,  we  could include  all job  seekers, for  example participants in labour 
market  programmes  and  “on-the-job”  seekers,  not  only  the  unemployed. 
3A  number of  additional  assumptions  are  often imposed  and  sometimes tested (for 
example  concavity,  homogeneity  of  degree  1,  m(0,V  ) = m(U,0) = 0). 
4This  is  the  “standard”  model;  for  references,  see  the  survey  in  Petrongolo  &  Pissar­
ides (2001). 
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and  vacancies are  ﬁlled  at the Poisson rates  λUt  =  Mt/Ut  and  λVt  =  Mt/Vt, 
respectively. 
The  number  of  matches  over  any  time period (the length  of  which  we 
normalise  to  1)  is  then  given  by5 
1 1 
M  =  m(Ut,Vt)dt  =  UtλUt dt  (2) 
0 0 
Ut  is,  in  turn,  given  by 
t t  t � � � � � � � 
′  Ut  =  U0 exp  −  λUs ds  +  ut ′  exp  −  λUs ds  dt  (3) 
0 0  t ′ 
where  U0  is  the  beginning  of  period  unemployment  stock  and  ut  is  the 
inﬂow  into  employment  during  the  period.  The  outﬂow  rate  will  under 
random  matching  be  the  sum  of  “old”  and  “new”  job seekers. 
To  estimate (2),  one  must  assume  something  about  the  within-period 
development  of  the inﬂow of  new unemployed,  ut  and  the  outﬂow  rate  λUt . 
The  assumptions  here  will  be  ut  =  u  and  λUt  =  λU.  Substituting  these 
into (3) and then into (2),  we get  unemployment  outﬂow (matches) as 
−λU 
−λU M  = 
�







u  (4) 
λU 
The  message  of  Equation  (4)  is  that  the  number  of  matches  depends 
on  the  outﬂow  rate  λ, the beginning-of-period  stock  of job  seekers  and  the 
within-period inﬂow  of job  seekers. 
The  time  aggregation  problem  when  estimating  (4)  on  discrete-time 
data  arises  because  the  second  term  on  the  right-hand  side  involves  the 
inﬂow  of job  seekers,  which is typically  not  observed.  If  the inﬂow  of  new 
job  seekers  is  non-trivial  compared  to  the  stock,  the  measurement  error 
will  also be non-trivial  and  result in potentially  seriously  biased  estimates. 
Stock-ﬂow  matching  Under  stock-ﬂow  matching,6 workers  ﬂowing into 
unemployment  ﬁrst  sample  the  stock  of  vacancies  and  some  of  the  work­
ers  immediately  match.  The  remaining,  unmatched  workers  (the  stock) 
will  sample  the  inﬂow  of  vacancies  and  leave  unemployment  at  some  rate. 
5We present the  matching  model  only in  terms  of the job-ﬁnding  rate. 
6See Coles (1994), Coles & Smith (1998), Coles & Petrongolo (2003)  and Gregg & 
Petrongolo (2005). 
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With  probability  1  − pu  unemployed  workers  must  wait  for  new  vacan­
cies  to  match  at  the  rate  λU.  Under  the  same  assumptions  as  under  ran­
dom matching, we get the following  unemployment  outﬂow equation under 
stock-ﬂow  matching: 
M  = 
�





1 − pu (1 − e −λU ) 
� 
u  (5) 
λU 
The  main diﬀerence between  the  expression (5) under  stock-ﬂow  match­
ing  and its  counterpart (4)  under  random  matching is that  a proportion 
pu  of the  within-period inﬂow  of job  seekers  will  match immediately. 
3  The  data 
3.1  Data  sources  and  deﬁnitions 
The data used in the empirical  analysis derive from the Swedish  HÄNDEL 
data  base  collected  by  the  National  Labour  Market  Board  (LMB)  since 
August,  1991.  This  data  base  includes  records  of  all  contacts  between 
job seekers  and  the  employment  oﬃces  of  the  Public  Employment  Service 
(PES).  Search through  the  PES  is  a  necessary  condition  for  UI  beneﬁt  eli­
gibility,  so unemployed job  seekers have  strong incentives to register at the 
PES. The contacts between job  seekers and the PES  result in a categor­
isation  of job  seekers into  openly  unemployed  and participants in diﬀerent 
labour  market  programmes.7  When  a job  seeker leaves the  register,  a des­
tination is  speciﬁed.  From  this  register  we have  constructed  series  of  stocks 
of  openly  unemployed  and programme participants  as  well  as inﬂows,  all  at 
the  municipality  level.  As the records  are daily,  we  could in principle  com­
pute  daily  ﬁgures  for  our  variables.  We  have,  however,  chosen  to  compute 
data  weekly,  monthly  and  quarterly.8  These  series  form  the  basis  of  our 
measures  of job  seekers.  The  outﬂow  of job seekers  to  work,  taken from  the 
same  source,  is  one  of  the  two  measures  of  the  number  of  matches  we  use. 
Although  there  are problems in the  registers (Bennmarker  et  al. 2000),  we 
believe  that  we  measure  our  variables  of  interest  with  reasonable  accuracy 
7Technically,  a job  seeker is put into  one  of  a large  number  of diﬀerent  categories in 
the  register.  Some  of  these  categories  correspond  to  “open  unemployment”  and  some 
categories  contain  programme  participants. 
8We  believe  that  daily  series  would  be  plagued  by  too  much  measurement  error. 
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A  substantial  fraction  of  the  job  seekers  leave  the  register  for  unknown 
reasons.  Studies by  Bring & Carling (2000), Sahin (2003),  and Forslund 
et  al.  (2004)  indicate  that  roughly  50  %  of  these  actually  leave  the  re­
gister  for  a  job.  Hence,  as  a  baseline  we  add  50  %  of  those  leaving  the 
register  for  unknown  reasons  when  we  compute  the  number  of  matches. 
We  have  checked  the  importance  of  this  and  the  results  with  and  without 
this  addition  were  very  similar. 
The  registers  from  the  LMB  also  include  information  of  vacancies.  We 
have  used  these raw data to compute  vacancy  stocks and inﬂows  as  well  as 
outﬂows  of  vacancies10 as  an  alternative  measure  of the  number  of  matches. 
Reporting  of  vacancies to the public employment  service (PES) is mandat­
ory  in  Sweden.  However,  it  is  well  known  that  far  from  all  vacancies  are 
reported  to  the  PES.11  It  may  also  very  well  be  the  case  that  coverage 
varies  over  time.  Statistics  Sweden  has  recently  started  collecting  vacancy 
data  by  survey  methods,  but  these  time  series  are  as  yet  too  short  to 
be  useful  in  our  analysis.  Hence,  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  we  have 
measurement  errors  in  our  vacancy  data. 
The  exact  data  deﬁnitions  are  presented  in  Appendix  A. 
3.2  A  brief  description  of  the  aggregate  data 
The data (seasonally  adjusted)  are plotted in  Figures  1  and  2.  A  number 
of  points  are  worth  noting.  First,  the  correlation  between  the  outﬂow  and 
inﬂow  of job  seekers is higher  than  the  correlation between  the  outﬂow  and 
the  stock  of job  seekers,  although the diﬀerence is  not  staggering (0.53  as 
compared  to  0.45).  Looking  instead  at  vacancies,  the  correlation  between 
the  inﬂow  and  the  outﬂow  is  0.16,  whereas  the  stock  and  the  outﬂow  are 
negatively  correlated;  the  correlation  is  -0.17. 
To  some  extent  these  patterns  in  the  data  indicate  that  increases  in 
matching  to  a  non-trivial  extent  are driven by increased inﬂows  of  vacancies 
and  unemployed  with  stocks  much  less  volatile.  Similar  patterns  are  also 
9Indeed,  given  the  way  we  have  been  able  to  construct  our  data,  we  believe  that  the 
quality  of  our  data  is  better  than  in  most  other  studies. 
10The  part  of  the  outﬂow  that  represents  ﬁlled  vacancies  rather  than  “withdrawn” 
vacancies. 
11See, for example, Ekström (2001), where the results of  a survey  to  ﬁrms concerning 
their  modes  of  recruiting  personnel  are  reported.  Almost  40  %  of  the  ﬁrms  in  that 
survey  reported  that  they  used  the  PES. 
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Figure  1:  Weekly  inﬂow,  outﬂow  (left-hand  side  axis),  and  stock  of  job 
seekers (right-hand  side  axis). 
Note:  Data  seasonally  adjusted  using  centered  dummies. 
found  in  the  UK  (Gregg  &  Petrongolo  2005)  and  the  US  (Blanchard  & 
Diamond  1989). 
Looking  at the time  series properties  of  the  variables, ADF  tests force­
fully  reject  non-stationarity  in  all  ﬂows,  whereas  the  results  for  the  stocks 
are  somewhat  ambiguous.12 
Further  inspection  of  Figure  2  reveals  that  even  the  weekly  inﬂow  of 
vacancies  is  of  a  non-trivial  size  compared  to  the  stock.  This  should  serve 
as  yet  a  warning  against  the  use  of  the  beginning  of  period  stock  as  a 
measure  of  available  vacant jobs  over  a  week,  and  of  course  even  more  so 
if  the  time  period  under  consideration  is  longer.  This  time-aggregation 
problem is less  serious for the  unemployed job  seekers,  where the inﬂow is 
much  smaller  relative  to  the  stock.  This  diﬀerence  between  vacancies  and 
unemployment  is  a  mirror  image  of  the  durations  of  the  spells,  which  are 
12The  test  results  depend  on  the  presence  of  a  deterministic  trend. 
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Figure 2:  Inﬂow,  outﬂow,  and  stock  of  vacancies (weekly). 
Note:  Data  seasonally  adjusted  using  centered  dummies. 
plotted  in  ﬁgures  3  and  4. 
Figure  3  shows  the  development  of  the  duration  of  ongoing  and  com­
pleted  spells of  unemployment from late 1991  to late 2002.13  The  develop­
ment  in  the  ﬁrst  half  of  the  1990s  is  partly  an  artifact  reﬂecting  that  the 
register  begins  in  August,  1991.  Some  spells  starting  earlier  have  a  recor­
ded  starting  date,  but  some  do  not.  This  means  that  the  rise  in  duration 
is  overestimated.14  However,  we  see  that  the  average  spell  typically  lasts 
between  some 30–40  weeks (completed  spells)  and 60–80  weeks (ongoing 
spells). 
Figure 4 shows  the development  of  the duration  of  vacancy  spells (ﬁlled 
and  unﬁlled).  These  durations  are  much  shorter  than  the  unemployment 
13What  we  actually  measure  is  the  duration  of  spells  in  the  registers  of  the  National 
Labour  Market  Board,  where  cycling  between  open  unemployment  and  participation  in 
ALMPs  is  counted  as  a  continuous  spell. 
14The  problem  is  probably  not  so  big;  the  time  pattern  of  median  of  the  spell  lengths 
is  very  similar  to  the  time  pattern  of  the  mean. 









Ongoing spells  Completed spells 
Figure 3:  Average duration (weeks)  of  ongoing  and  completed  unemploy­
ment  spells. 
Note:  Data  not  seasonally  adjusted. 
durations  shown  in  Figure  3  (between  1 and  2  weeks  for  ﬁlled  vacancies). 
However,  also  for  vacancies  it  is  true  that  the  average  duration  of  spells  in 
the  vacancy  stock  is  signiﬁcantly  longer  than  the  average  duration  of  the 
ﬁlled  vacancies. 
The  observation  that  the  durations  for  ongoing  spells  of  unemploy­
ment  and  vacancies  are  signiﬁcantly  longer  than  for  the  completed  spells 
is  clearly  at  odds  with  the  predictions  of  random  matching  models,  where 
we  would  expect  ongoing  and  completed  spells  to  be  of  equal  length  in  a 
steady  state.  The observed pattern  could  reﬂect duration dependence, but 
it is  also  consistent  with predictions  of  the  stock-ﬂow  matching  framework 
presented  in  Section  2. 







7  Vacancy stock  Filled vacancies 
Figure 4:  Average  completed  and  uncompleted  vacancy  duration (weeks). 
Note:  Data  not  seasonally  adjusted. 
3.3  The  job  seekers 
Our  data  base  contains  information  that  enables  us  to  describe  the  job 
seekers  in  some  detail.  In  Table  1  we  show  the  numbers  of  persons  in 
diﬀerent  categories  of  job  seekers  as  well  as  the  outﬂow  rates  to  jobs15 
from  each  of these  categories.  We  show the job  seekers by the duration 
of the spells in the registers of the PES  as well  as by  “type”  of job  seeker 
(i.e.,  openly  unemployed,  programme  participants,  employed  job  seekers 
and  those  part-time  unemployed,  employed  by  the  hour  or  temporary  em­
ployed;  all  according  to  the  PES  registers). 
Looking  ﬁrst  at  the  number  of  persons  in  diﬀerent  categories  of  job 
seekers,  we  see  that  openly  unemployed  and programme participants  vastly 
outnumber the diﬀerent types  of  employed (or  semi-employed) job  seekers 
in  our data base.  In  terms  of outﬂow  rates  to jobs,  the  unemployed  and  the 
category including temporary  employed  and  other  “semi  employed”  persons 
15The  weekly  outﬂow  in  relation  to  the  stock. 
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Category  Average  number  Average  weekly 
of  persons  outﬂow  rate 
By  type  of  job  seeker: 
Openly  unemployed  317  106  .021 
Programme  participants  146  712  .004 
Employed job  seekers  29  477  .009 
Temporary  employed,  employed 
by  the  hour,  part-time  employed  59  500  .020 
By  duration  of  spell: 
0–30  days  43  043  .032 
31–60  days  39  436  .020 
61–90  days  36  341  .032 
91–120  days  26  509  .026 
121–240  days  84  229  .021 
241–360  days  54  852  .016 
361–480  days  38  735  .012 
481–600  days  28  645  .010 
>600  days  112  027  .007 
Note:  Data  for  August  1991–October  2002. 
exit to jobs  much  more  rapidly  than  employed job  seekers  and,  especially, 
programme  participants.  This  feature  would  suggest  that  one  could  gain 
by  disaggregating  across diﬀerent types of job  applicants in the  estimation 
of  the  matching  functions. 
Looking  next  at job  seekers  with diﬀerent  spell lengths,  the  exit  rates 
to  employment  decrease  by  spell  lengths  almost  monotonically,  the  main 
exceptions  being  exit  rates  from  spells  lasting  between  60  and  90  days.  As 
programme  participants,  almost  by  construction,  have  longer  spells  than 
the  openly  unemployed  on  average,  there  is  a  problem  in  the  separate 
identiﬁcation  of  the  contributions  of  openly  unemployed  job  seekers  and 
programme  participants  on  the  one  hand,  and  job  seekers  with  diﬀerent 
durations of  spells on the other hand.  Earlier  ﬁndings (Edin & Holmlund 
1991, Hallgren 1996)  that programme participants  contribute to  matching 
to  a  lesser  extent  than  the  openly  unemployed  hence  may  reﬂect  duration 
dependence  or selection as well  as programme  eﬀects per se.  In  Section  5.2 
IFAU—Random  and  stock-ﬂow  models  of  labour  market  matching  12 we  deal  with  this  issue  brieﬂy. 
4  Econometric  speciﬁcation 
Let  Mt  denote  the  expected  ﬂow  matching  rate  at  time  t.  Then 
Mt  =  ptut  +  λtUt  (6) 
where  ut  denotes the inﬂow  of job  seekers,  pt  the  proportion  of  these  that 
match  immediately,  Ut  the  stock  of job  seekers  and  λt  the  rate  at  which 
the  stock  matches.16  We  have  experimented  with  estimating  models  for 
both  the  outﬂow to  work  of job  seekers  and  the  outﬂow  of  vacancies.  The 
latter  models  did  not,  however,  give  any  sensible  results,  so  we  restrict  our 
discussion to the  outﬂow  of job  seekers.17 
In discrete time,  equation (6) can be  written 
Mt  =  atUt−1 +  btut  +  εt  (7) 
where  εt  is  an  added disturbance term (unrelated  to  any  time  aggregation 
problem). 
We  now  use  the  expressions  derived  in  Section  2  to  specify  at  and  bt 
for  both  random  matching  and  stock-ﬂow  matching. 
Random  matching  Under  random  matching we have (see Equation (4)) 
at  = 1 − e−λU 
bt  = 1 − 1−e −λU 
λU 
To  complete  the  speciﬁcation  of  the  random  matching  model,  a  func­
tional form for the  matching  equation (1) must be  chosen.  If it is  assumed 




λUt  =  exp  α0 +  α1 ln  (8) 
Ut−1 
16The  exposition follows  the presentation in Gregg & Petrongolo (2005),  where  more 
details  are  found. 
17We  suspect  that  this  may reﬂect  the  measurement problems discussed in Section  3.1. 
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at  = 1 − e−λU 
1−pu 
�
bt  = 
�
1 −  λU  (1 − e−λU )





λUt  =  exp  α0 +  α1 ln  +  α2 ln  (9) 
Ut−1  Ut−1 
Next,  we  also  allow the instantaneous  matching probability (pu) of  the 




put  =  exp  γ0 +  γ1 ln  (10) 
ut 
Finally,  we  include  a  quadratic  trend  in  the  expressions  for  λUt  and 
put,  either imposing  the same trend for both  or  estimating  separate trends 
for  λUt  and  put 
18 
Comparing  the  models  for  random  matching  and  stock-ﬂow  matching, 
we  see  that  the  latter  models  reduce  to  the  former  if  α2 = 0  and  pu  = 0, 
whereas  stock-ﬂow  matching  implies  α1 = 0.  These  restrictions  are  easily 
tested. 
5  Results 
Our  data  enable  us  to  look  closer  into  some  issues  discussed  in  the  in­
troduction.  First,  to  discuss  problems  of  time  aggregation,  we  will  show 
estimates of  aggregate log-linear matching functions using  weekly,  monthly 
and  quarterly  data.  In  doing  this,  we  both  use  beginning-of-period  stocks 
of  vacancies  and job seekers and input  measures that include half  of the 
inﬂows during  the period in question.  Burdett et al. (1994)  showed  that if 
stocks  are  mean  reverting, then the  use of beginning-of-period  stocks gives 
rise  to  a  downward  bias  in  matching  elasticities  with  respect  to  vacancies 
and job  seekers  and  that this bias is an increasing  function  of  the length  of 
the  time  interval.  The  use  of  the  beginning-of-period  stocks  plus  half  the 
inﬂow  is  a  solution  to  this  problem  that  has  been  suggested  by  Gregg  & 
18Estimates  of  models  with  separate  trends  did  not  converge  unless  other  restrictions 
were  imposed  and  are  not  reported. 
14  IFAU—Random  and  stock-ﬂow  models  of  labour  market  matching Petrongolo (1997)  and follows from a Taylor  expansion  of  exp(−λ) around 
λ  = 0  in  equation  (4). 
The  main  part  of  our  results,  however,  pertain  to  whether  random 
matching  or  stock-ﬂow  matching  seems  to  be  a  better  description  of  the 
matching  process  in  the  Swedish  labour  market. 
We  have  experimented  (quite  a  lot)  with  diﬀerent  regional  matching 
models,  e.g.  allowing  (parametrically)  for  spatial  correlations  or  taking 
averages  over  separate  time-series  models  for  each  municipality.  However, 
all  results  of  those  experiments  led  to  the  conclusion  that  nothing  was 
gained  by  disaggregating  across  regions. 
Employed  job  seekers  In Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)  it is  shown 
that,  under  reasonable assumptions,  neglecting  employed job  seekers  when 
measuring  the total  number  of job  seekers will produce biased  estimates  of 
the  parameters  in  the  matching  function.19  In  our  data,  we  have  informa­
tion  on  employed job  seekers  who  are  registered  at the PES. Although  the 
registered  employed job  seekers  are  a  selected  subset  of  all  employed job 
seekers,  they  are  likely  to  be  reasonably  representative  for  the  employed 
job seekers  who  apply  for  the  registered  vacancies. 
The  estimated  models  all  use  measures  of  the  number  of job  seekers 
including  the  number  of  employed  job  seekers  as  well  as  the  number  of 
part-time  unemployed,  temporarily  employed  and  those  employed  by  the 
hour.  Our  measures  of  the  outﬂow  to  employment,  consequently,  includes 
not  only  the  unemployed  and  the  programme  participants,  but  also  em­
ployed job  seekers and part-time unemployed, temporarily  employed  and 
those  employed  by  the  hour  changing  employment  status  to  “more”  em­
ployment.20 
The  number  of job  seekers  To  sum  up  our discussion  of  measurement 
issues,  we  end  up  using  a  measure (used in  all  estimated  models)  of the 
number  of  matches  containing  the  following  components: 
1.  openly  unemployed job  seekers leaving  the register for work 
19Job  search  among  the  employed  is  most  likely  rather  responsive  to  labour  market 
tightness.  If  this  is  the  case,  the  eﬀect  of  vacancies  on  the  number  of  matches  will  be 
under-estimated  and the  eﬀect  of  unemployed job  seekers  over-estimated. 
20See  Appendix A for  a  precise  deﬁnition  of  what  this  means.  One  example  of  “more 
employment”  would  be  that  a  part-time  unemployed  becomes  full-time  employed. 
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3.  employed  job  seekers  and  part-time  unemployed,  temporarily  em­
ployed  and  those  employed by  the hour  changing  employment  status 
to  “more”  employment 
4.  half  the  number  of persons leaving  the  register for  unknown  reasons. 
Although  not  ﬂawless,  this  measure  should  be  considered  accurate  in  com­
parison  with  most  alternatives previously  used  to  estimate Swedish  match­
ing  functions.21 
5.1  Random  matching:  log-linear  matching  functions 
To  check  how  sensitive  the  estimates  are  to  the  sampling  frequency  in  the 
data,  we have  estimated  standard log-linear  matching  functions  on weekly, 
monthly  and  quarterly  data.  We  have  also  used  lagged  stocks  plus  half 
of the inﬂow  of  vacancies  and  unemployment (at the  same frequencies)  as 
suggested  by  Gregg  &  Petrongolo  (1997)  as  regressors.  The  results  are 
displayed  in  the  ﬁrst  six  columns  of  Table  2. 22 
By  and large,  the  results  are  consistent  with the  theoretical predictions. 
Hence,  the  estimated scale  elasticity is decreasing  with decreasing  measure­
ment frequency in the data.  Furthermore, for  each frequency,  the  estimated 
scale  elasticity is higher  when  the  measures  of job  seekers  and  vacancies in­
clude half  the inﬂow during  the period  than  when the beginning-of-period 
stocks  are  used.  In  fact,  all  point  estimates  of  the  scale  elasticity  are  well 
below  unity  and  only  non-signiﬁcantly  diﬀerent  from  unity  in  the  model 
estimated  on  weekly  data  including  the  half  of  the  inﬂows  during  the  week 
of  vacancies  and job  seekers. 
The  estimated  elasticities  are  generally  much  higher  for  job  seekers 
than  for  vacancies.  This  may,  of  course,  partly  reﬂect  measurement  error 
in  the  vacancy  series.  However,  the  ﬁnding  seems  to  be  fairly  consistent 
with the  results  reported in Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001),  although the 
results  reported  there  vary  a  lot.23 
21Previous Swedish  studies have mainly  used knowledge of  the inﬂow of  vacancies and 
vacancy  stocks  to  construct  a  measure  of  the  outﬂow  of  vacancies. 
22The  same  models  have  been  estimated  using  an  outﬂow  measure  excluding  those 
leaving  the  register  for  unknown  reasons.  The  results  were  qualitatively  similar. 
23Estimating  models including quadratic time trends generally give  somewhat higher 
point  estimates  for  vacancies  and  somewhat  lower  point  estimates  for  the  number  of 
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and  matching 
Edin & Holmlund (1991)  and Hallgren (1996) found  that programme parti­
cipants  contribute  to  matching  to  a  lesser  extent  than  openly  unemployed 
job  seekers.  However,  because  programme  participants  on  average  also 
have  longer  spells  of  non-employment,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  earlier 
results  reﬂect  that programme participation  causes  smaller hazards  to jobs 
or  that  the  lower  job-ﬁnding  rates  of  programme  participants  simply  re­
ﬂects  that  they  on  average  have  longer  non-employment  durations.24 
In  columns  7  and  8  in  Table  2  we  present  the  results  of  adding  the 
share  of  programme  participants  of  the  total  number  of  job  seekers  as 
well  as  the  fraction  of  long-term  unemployed  (>  12  months;  column  7) 
and  short-term  unemployed  (≤  12  months;  column  8)  to  the  log-linear 
matching  model.  The  eﬀects  are  fairly  precisely  estimated  and  clearly 
indicate  that  programme  participants  contribute  to  matching  to  a  lesser 
extent  than  openly  unemployed job  seekers,  also  when  controlling for the 
shares  of  long-term  or  short-term  unemployed  job  seekers.25  Hence,  the 
estimated  negative  eﬀect  of  programme  participants  on  matching  seems 
not  only  to  reﬂect  that  programme  participants  on  average  have  longer 
unemployment  durations. 
job  seekers.  The  estimated  scale  elasticities  are  fairly  similar  in  those  models,  except 
for  the  models  estimated  on  quarterly  data,  where  the  estimated  scale  elasticities  are 
much  higher,  especially  in  the  model  including  half  of  the  within-period  inﬂows,  where 
the  estimated  elasticity is  signiﬁcantly greater  than  unity (point  estimate 1.64). 
24Neither  Edin  &  Holmlund  (1991)  nor  Hallgren  (1996)  had  information  on  both 
durations  and  programme  participation. 
25The shares of long-term and  short-term unemployed  enter the estimated  model  with 
the  expected  signs,  negative  and  positive,  respectively. 
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P(µ  = 1) 
#  Obs. 
¯2 R
Table  2:  Estimated  log-linear  matching  functions

1 2 3 4  5  6 7 8 
weekly  weekly  monthly  monthly  quarterly  quarterly  weekly  weekly 
2.03  -1.73  4.82  3.66  7.68  5.61  -5.26  -4.94 
(1.24)  (1.59)  (1.48)  (1.45)  (1.18)  (1.76)  (1.47)  (1.60) 
0.06  0.15  0.08 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.03) 
0.47  0.32  0.24 
(0.08)  (0.09)  (0.07) 
0.24  0.22  0.15  0.26  0.26 
(0.05)  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
0.63  0.35  0.32  0.84  0.85 
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.10) 
-0.21  -0.21 





0.53  0.87  0.47  0.57  0.32  0.47  1.10  1.11 
0.00  0.30  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.39  0.42 
580  580  129  129  38  38  580  580 
0.47  0.49  0.46  0.45  0.69  0.69  0.51  0.50 
Note:  Weekly,  monthly,  and  quarterly  data  1991-2002.  The  outﬂow  includes  half  of  those  leaving  the  register  for 
unknown  reasons.  Newey-West  standard  errors in brackets.  Data  seasonally  adjusted  using  centered dummies.  Error 
term  assumed  to follow AR(5) process  and parameters for this process have been estimated (but  not  reported in the 




5.3  Testing  for  stock-ﬂow  matching 
To  test whether  matching is better described  as  random  matching  or  stock­
ﬂow  matching  we  have  estimated  the  models  presented  in  Section  4.  The 
results  are  presented  in  Table  3. 26 
In  the  ﬁrst  column  of  Table  3,  the  estimates  of  the  speciﬁcation  corres­
ponding to  random  matching are given.  The  estimates  suggest a  signiﬁcant 
eﬀect  of  the lagged  stocks  of job  seekers  and  vacancies  and  a  transition  rate 
to jobs  at  about 1 %  a  week, implying  an  average duration  of  unemploy­
ment  spells  equal  to just above 80  weeks  evaluated  at  sample  means  of  the 
variables. 
In  column  2,  the  estimates  of  the  simplest form  of  stock-ﬂow  model  are 
displayed.  The  point  estimate  of  the  lagged  stocks  now  drops  and  is  not 
signiﬁcantly  diﬀerent from zero.  At the same time, the point  estimate cap­
turing  the  eﬀect  on the  outﬂow to jobs  of  the inﬂow  of  vacancies is highly 
signiﬁcant  as is the  estimate  of the proportion  of job  seekers immediately 
ﬁnding  a job.  This pattern is  clearly  consistent  with  stock-ﬂow  matching 
and  inconsistent  with  random  matching.  Turning  to  the  estimates  of  the 
other,  more general, formulations, the  same conclusion follows.  Hence, the 
estimates  reject  random  matching  in  favour  of  stock-ﬂow  matching. 
The  ﬁt  of  one  of  the  estimated  models  (the  model  in  column  6  of 
Table  3;  all  models  give  fairly  similar  patterns)  in  terms  of  actual  and 
predicted  values  is  shown  in  Figure  5. Of  course, the  ﬁt is not perfect, but 
the  estimated  residuals do not show  any pattern that is easily  captured by 
the  eye. 
The  estimated  models  can be  used  to predict  the duration  of  unemploy­
ment  spells.  To  do  this,  we  generate  an  estimate  of  the  outﬂow  rate  by 
relating  the  number  of predict  matches  to  the (lagged)  stock  of job  seekers, 
λt  =  Mt//Ut−1.  The  inverse  of  λ � t  then  gives  the  predicted  duration.  In 
Figure  6  we  show  durations  of  ongoing  spells  and  the  predictions  derived 
from,  once  again,  the  model  in  the  sixth  column  of  Table  3. 
Comparing  the  actual  and  the  predicted  durations,  we  see  that  the 
predictions  are  systematically  higher  than  the  actual  values  roughly  until 
26A  number  of  other  speciﬁcations  were  tested.  Measuring  the  outﬂow  to  employment 
without  those  leaving  for  unknown  destinations  produced  very  similar  results,  as  did 
estimating  models  with  more  restrictive  deﬁnitions  of  job  seekers  and  corresponding 
outﬂows.  When  estimating  models  with  separate  trends  for  λ  and  p,  convergence  was 
not  achieved  unless  other  restrictions  were  imposed. 
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1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
Model  1  Model  2  Model  3  Model  3  Model  2  Model  3  Model  1  Model  2 
trend  trend  inﬂow  inﬂow 
λU  [0.01]  [0.007]  [0.005]  [0.006]  [0.01]  [0.004]  [0.036]  [0.004] 
α0  -3.66  -3.22  -3.89  -3.36  -2.85  -3.79  -3.32  -3.19 
(0.12)  (0.15)  (0.50)  0.18  (0.32)  (0.53)  (0.14)  (0.15) 
α1  0.19  0.02  -0.19  0  0.09  -0.26  0.29  0.06 
(0.03)  (0.04)  (0.15)  —  (0.07)  (0.19)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
α2  —  0.36  0.44  0.36  0.40  0.57  —  0.33 
(0.04)  (0.07)  0.03  (0.04)  — 
pu  —  0.21  [0.27]  [0.23]  0.22  [0.30]  —  0.21 
(0.01)  (0.01)  —  (0.01) 
γ0  —  —  -1.28  -1.47  —  -1.15  —  — 
(0.14)  0.08  (0.15) 
γ1  —  —  0.17  0.06  —  0.24  — 
(0.08)  0.04  (0.07) 
t  —  —  —  —  0.13  0.07  —  — 
(0.05)  (0.02) 
t2  —  —  —  —  -0.0003  −0.0002  —  — 
(9.3 ×  10−5 ) 
#  Obs  580  580  580  580  580  580  580  580 
R
2  0.43  0.66  0.66  0.66  0.66  0.67  0.46  0.66 
Note:  1991–2002,  weekly  data.  The  dependent  variable  includes  half  of  the  outﬂow  to 
unknown  destinations.  Seasonally  adjusted  data  using  centered  dummies.  Dependent 
variable:  weekly  unemployment  outﬂow.  Estimated  with  nonlinear  least  squares;  the 
error  term  was  assumed  to  follow  an  AR(5)  process  and  the  parameters  of  the  process 
were  estimated,  but  not  reproduced  in  the  table.  Asymptotic  standard  errors  in  brackets. 
Parameters that  are  not  signiﬁcant  at the 5 % level in italics.  Numbers in  square brackets 
are  computed  from  the  estimated  parameters  using  the  speciﬁcation  of  the  model  in 
question. 
1998.  Partly,  this  reﬂects  an  artifact  of  the  data—the  register  starts  in 
August, 1991,  and for  most early  spells in  the  register beginning before  this 
date,  there is  no information  about when  spells  actually  started.  We  should 
also  notice  that  the  predicted  and  the  actual  durations  are  conceptually 
diﬀerent.  The  predicted  durations  are  both  forward-looking  and  myopic 
in  the  sense  that  they  show  how  durations  would  evolve  given  a  constant 
outﬂow  rate from  each point in  time.  The  actual  values,  on  the  other hand, 
are  the  results  of  historical  outﬂow  rates.  Hence,  unless  in  a  steady  state 












Figure  5:  Actual  and  predicted  outﬂow  from  unemployment  and  residuals 
we  should  not  expect  the  two  to  coincide.27 
It  could  be  the  case  that  random  matching  is  rejected  because  we  im-
pose  constant  returns  on  the  matching  function,  which,  according  to  the 
estimated log-linear matching  models, is not rejected  only  if  we add half  of 
the inﬂows  of  vacancies  and job  seekers to the beginning-of-period  stocks, 
see  Table  2.  When  the  log-linear  model  is  estimated  imposing  the  con­
stant  returns  to  scale  assumption,  the  coeﬃcient  on  vacancies  divided  by 
job seekers  is  0.33. 
Column  7  in  Table  3  shows  the  results  when  the  model  with  random 
matching is  estimated  with half  of the inﬂow  of  vacancies  and job  seekers 
added  to  the  stocks.  The  estimate  of  α1 is  0.29,  which  is  very  close  to  the 
estimates  in  the  log-linear  model,  0.33. 
The  results from  estimation  of the  simplest  model  that  allows for  stock­
ﬂow  matching  are  presented  in  column  8.  The  eﬀect  of  the  stocks  is  very 
small  and  insigniﬁcant,  and  the  coeﬃcient  on  the  inﬂow  of  vacancies  rel­
27Apart  from  possible  complications  arising  from  heterogeneity. 
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Figure 6:  Actual  and predicted duration  of  register  spells  of job  seekers 
ative to the job  seekers is 0.33,  which is  about the  same  size  as the  model 
in  column  2  in  Table  3.  The  estimated  instantaneous  matching  probab­
ility  equals  0.21  which  is  the  same  as  in  the  other  models.  So,  also  in  a 
model  where  the  constant  returns  to  scale  assumption  is  more  likely  to  be 
satisﬁed,  we  obtain  the  result  that  data  reject  a  speciﬁcation  with  random 
matching. 
6  Concluding  comments 
In  this  paper  we  have  estimated  a  number  of  matching  models  using  a 
data base  with information  on  stocks, inﬂows  and  outﬂows  of job  seekers 
and  vacancies  from  which  we  can  compute  data  at  virtually  any  frequency. 
Our  main  purposes  have  been  to  test  whether  matching  is  best  described 
by  random  matching  or  stock-ﬂow  models  of  matching  and  to  shed  light 
on  the  importance  of  the  data  frequency  for  the  parameter  estimates  in 
standard  log-linear  matching  models. 
22  IFAU—Random  and  stock-ﬂow  models  of  labour  market  matching Regarding  the  choice  between  random  matching  and  stock-ﬂow  match­
ing,  our evidence rejects random matching—the parameter  estimates in all 
estimated  model  speciﬁcations  are  consistent  with  stock-ﬂow  matching  and 
inconsistent  with  random  matching.  More  precisely,  we  ﬁnd  that  a  non­
trivial fraction of  new job  seekers match instantly (within the  ﬁrst week). 
We also ﬁnd  that stocks of  “old”  vacancies and job  seekers do not contrib­
ute  signiﬁcantly  to  matching,  whereas  the inﬂow  of  vacancies  matches  with 
the lagged  stock  of job  seekers.  Our  results  also  suggest  that programme 
participants  contribute  to  matching  to  a  lesser  extent  than  openly  unem­
ployed job  seekers.  Unlike in previous  studies, this  result is derived  while 
at  the  same  time  controlling  for  the  duration  of  non-employment  among 
job seekers,  suggesting  that  the  result  not  only  reﬂects  the  fact  that  pro­
gramme  participants,  on  average,  have  longer  non-employment  durations 
than  openly  unemployed job  seekers. 
Consistent  with  theoretical  predictions,  we  ﬁnd  that  the  use  of  lagged 
stocks  as  right-hand  side  variables  in  matching  functions  (i.e.,  failing  to 
take account  of  the within-period inﬂow of job  seekers and  vacancies) gives 
lower  estimates  of  matching  elasticities  and  that  this  is  more  pronounced 
the  lower  the  measurement  frequency.  This  evidence  provides  a  warning 
against  strong  beliefs  in  estimates  of  the  scale  elasticity  of  the  matching 
function  derived  from  annual  or  quarterly  data. 
The  main  caveat  when  interpreting  our  results  is  that  there  are  good 
reasons  to  believe  that  there  are  measurement  errors  in  our  vacancy  data, 
which  most likely  may have biased  our  matching  elasticities  with  respect  to 
vacancies  downwards.  Measurement  error  may  also  be  the  reason  behind 
our  failure  to  estimate  any  reasonable  model  of  the  outﬂow  of  vacancies. 
The  rejection  of  random  matching  against  stock-ﬂow  matching  has 
some  implications  for  how  one  should  understand  the  existence  of  match­
ing  frictions.  Such  frictions  may  arise  for  at  least  two  related  but  distinct 
reasons.  A  ﬁrst  reason  is  that  it  may  take  time  for  homogeneous  workers 
and  jobs  to  match  simply  because  there  is  imperfect  information  about 
potential  trading  partners.28  A  second  reason  is  that  there  may  be  het­
erogeneity  on  both  sides  of  the  market  and  that  ﬁnding  the  “right”  match 
may  take  time  even  in  the  presence  of  good  information  about  potential 
trading  partners—the  right  match  may  simply  not  be  instantly  available. 
Obviously, heterogeneity  squares  well  with  stock-ﬂow  matching.  Hence, 
28See, for  example, the discussion in Petrongolo & Pissarides (2001)  about  coordina­
tion  failures. 
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important  explanation  of  search  frictions  in  the  Swedish  labour  market. 
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All  data  used  derive  from  the  data  base  “Händel”  of  the  National  Labour 
Market  Board.  This data base is available from August, 1991  and  onwards. 
Our  sample  runs  from  August,  1991,  through  October,  2002. 
The  number  of  matches  The  number  of matches  equals the  outﬂow 
to  regular  jobs  irrespective  of  the  previous  state  in  the  data  base.  This 
means  that  we, in  addition to  openly  unemployed job  seekers (categories 11, 
12,  13,  14,  91,  96,  97,  98,  99)  and  labour  market  programme  participants, 
have  included  the  outﬂows  of  employed  job  seekers  (category  41),  part­
time  unemployed  (cat.  21),  temporarily  employed  (cat.  31),  and  those 
employed by  the hour (cat.  22)  who change status.  We have  experimented 
with  more  narrow  deﬁnitions,  but  results  were  similar. 
If  an  openly  unemployed job  seeker  moves into  semi-employment (cat­
egories  21,  22  and  31),  the  outﬂow  date  is  adjusted  to  the  date  when  the 
openly  unemployed  enters  semi-employment.  In  all,  persons  with  spells  in 
the semi-employment  categories for more than 30 days are counted  as leav­
ing  the  register for  a  regular job.  The basic frequency  used is the  outﬂow 
over  a  week. 
The  number  of job  seekers  The  number  of job  seekers is the total 
number of individuals in the data base except  ﬁshers (cat.  23), job  seekers 
applying  for jobs  outside Sweden (cat.  34), disabled (categories 35, 42, 43 
71,  and 72)  and those  on  sabbatical leave (who  are  not  allowed  to  take  a 
job), (cat.  89).  This  stock is  measured  at the  end  of  each  week. 
The  inﬂow  of  job  seekers  The  inﬂow  of  job  seekers  includes  the 
total inﬂow (during  a  week)  to the data base. 
Vacancies  The  vacancy  measure  include  only  those  vacancies  that 
are  reported  to  the PES. Only  the  number  of  regular  vacant jobs  are in­
cluded.  Notable is that  around 25%  of  the  vacant jobs  are  withdrawn the 
same  day  as  they  are  reported  as  vacant.  The  inﬂow  is  measured  during  a 
week  and  the  stock  is  measured  at  the  end  of  each  week. 
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